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DEF CON 19 - Artem Dinaburg - Bit-squatting: DNS Hijacking Without Exploitation

DEFCONConference · 4K views · 2013-11-02 · 45:14

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Overview

Artem Dinaburg's DEF CON 19 talk on bit-squatting, where DRAM bit flips cause DNS requests to go to domains one bit off from the intended one. It shows how hardware faults can be exploited for hijacking without any software exploit.

On Hacker News

Recommended as a fun, practical talk on why bit flips matter for security, and cited in ECC memory discussions.

Recommended by 2 HN people across 2 months · HN mentions 2018–2023

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What people said

hayst4ck · 2022-09 · Strong recommendation

A really fun DefCon talk on bitsquatting. Bitsquatting is the practice of registering domains that are one bit off from a popular one: [VIDEO] google.com vs ooogle.com >>> chr(int('0b1100111', 2)) 'g' >>> chr(int('0b1101111', 2)) 'o' If the 4th to last bit of 'g' were to flip before writing to disk, you could get persistent requests to ooogle.com Having done queries against very large datasets at a large company, I can say for certain that this happens much more than you think it might.

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btschaegg · 2018-08 · Recommendation

Regarding "some hardware errors": This might include operationg conditions you didn't consider; say: The divisor in your code went through a non-ECC DRAM module (maybe in a disk drive) that runs hotter than its specified operating temperature would allow and a random bit-flip changes your `1` into a `0`. On this topic, the talk on Bitsquatting from Artem Dinaburg during Defcon 19 is worth watching. The most interesting part on bit flips starts around 15:05 minutes: [VIDEO]

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josephg · 2023-10 · Reference

Encryption and signing don't protect against memory corruption. For example, I download software from the internet then hash it. The hash matches. Before the bytes are written to disk locally, a bit flips in RAM. The corrupted data is written to disk and used. Likewise, dnssec doesn't protect you against DNS bitsquatting attacks[1] because the domain name can be changed before the DNS request is made. So the DNS response your computer makes for a-azon.com might be totally valid and signed. It can come through DoH or whatever. The problem is that your browser thought it was the response for amazon.com and chrome send a bitsquatter your amazon cookies. (Oops). [1] [VIDEO]

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