HackerTube.dev

How our voting system (and IRV) betrays your favourite candidate

The Center for Election Science · 35K views · 2013-12-02 · 3:35

Open on YouTube ↗

If playback is restricted in your region, try opening the original video. Use Mark watched to add it to your marked videos.

Overview

The Center for Election Science explains favorite betrayal in instant-runoff voting: in some elections, ranking your favorite first can cause your least favorite to win. It contrasts this with plurality voting's spoiler problem.

On Hacker News

The standard link in ranked-choice voting threads to show IRV does not eliminate the spoiler effect.

Recommended by 5 HN people across 4 months · HN mentions 2014–2023

Topics

Search by tags

What people said

godelski · 2021-06 · Recommendation

RCV doesn't solve what is claimed in the article. It is interesting since countries that they give as examples are clear evidence of this. (Yes, I'm going to advocate cardinal systems like Approval, Range/Score, and STAR) > More moderate candidates. RCV doesn't encourage this at all. Australia is a clear example of this. In the house Liberal and Labor (the two major parties) control 85% of seats. The next major party (National) is part of a coalition with the Liberals and this sums to 95%. Things are only slightly better in the senate. Look at any country that uses IRC/RCV and you'll see a similar pattern. The system didn't encourage more parties and more moderates, Australia still has divided politics like America. As to the more parties, I have an alternative explanation. They use a parliament, which uses proportionate representation. Don't buy it? Go look at countries with parliaments and don't have IRV and you'll find similar distributions. We also need to recognize that in America our parties are closer to coalitions in other countries out of the necessity. I'm not sure how anyone can look at someone like AOC or Sanders and think they are the same "party" (by other country norms) as Biden or Pelosi (similarly on the Republican side, though Trump caused a consolidation). > ranked-choice voting can drastically reduce the possibility of spoilers. Yes, but no. It reduces spoilers when a candidate is not going to win anyways (e.g. Jo Jorgensen spoiling Trump). But this does n

Read the original HN comment ↗
elihu · 2021-06 · Recommendation

I agree with what /u/zestyping says in the other comment, so I won't repeat it. But here's a video explaining the strategic voting issue: [VIDEO] Also, wikipedia has an example of a non-monotonic result here: [LINK]

Read the original HN comment ↗
user234683 · 2019-10 · Recommendation

I always recommend this pair of videos when discussing STAR voting vs other alternative systems. The first video is an easy-to-follow explanation of how spoiler effects can happen in both plurality voting and IRV [1]. In the second [2], the guy who created Star voting applies Ka-Ping Yee's methods to Star voting and animates it side-by-side with alternative systems to show its performance. [1] [VIDEO] [2] [LINK]

Read the original HN comment ↗

Sources

Video by The Center for Election Science, played through YouTube.

Data and selection notes

HN summaries and labels may contain AI errors. HN dates refer to discussions, not video publication.

HN Library: HackerTube export (2026-10-31) and open-index/hacker-news. Upstream summaries and classifications may contain AI errors.

Views, duration and playback status refresh separately from the published catalog. When an update fails, existing data remains visible.

Selection checks
  • SaaS & AI candidates: Topic keywords do not match
  • Editor-approved picks: Editorial review is required

Rule matches identify candidates. They do not guarantee video quality or financial results.

About the library and its sources